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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID E. SHELEY, 
, / 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
/ 
vs. • • -
MERRILL, LYNCH, PIERCE, / 
FENNER & SMITH, INC., a-
Corporation, 
/ 
Defendant, Third Case No. 14093 
Party Plaintiff 
and Respondent, / 
vs. 
/ 
ROBERT G. OYLER, 
Third Party Defendant. / 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the Appellant, who was 
the Plaintiff in the Lower Court, against the Respondent 
Corporation, which was the Defendant in the Lower Court, seeking 
recovery against the Respondent Corporation for damages suffered 
by Appellant resulting from the sale to Appellant by Respondent 
broker•s employee of unregistered bonds that were touted to 
4* 
Appellant by Respondent broker's registered agent and wherein the 
bonds were not items being dealt in or held by the Respondent, 
being a privately touted investment of the employee of the 
Respondent and having no ready market value, or in the alternative, 
that the Respondent be compelled to replace the non-marketable 
bonds sold to Appellant by Respondent's employee for the same dollar 
value of Pacific Power and Light stock that Respondent's employee 
induced the Appellant to sell in order to obtain funds to invest in 
the non-marketable bonds purchased by Appellant as a result of the 
advice and inducement of. Respondent's employee. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent is a Corporation registered as a licensed 
Securities Dealer operating a brokerage house engaged in the 
purchase and sale of stocks and bonds, and had in its employ, 
one, Robert G. Oyler, who was authorized to perform the duties 
of an Account Executive for said Respondent at its Ogden Office. 
(R-5) 
Robert G. Oyler, the employee of the Respondent, was 
not given any formal classroom training and is alleged by the 
Respondent to have been "constantly under the supervision of 
Merrill, Lynch offices in the Ogden Office" (R-16), and that it 
was customary for Oyler as an Account Executive to advise 
customers, such as the Appellant herein, and give investment 
advice in reference to stocks, bonds, or debentures, and to make 
M recommendations to a customer as to the purchase of certain stocks/• 
bonds, or debentures, and further, to advise customers as to the 
timing of the sale of stocks held by a customer in his brokerage 
account. (R-17,18) That the Respondent considered Oyler to be 
an employee. (R-19) 
The Appellant met the Plaintiff's employee, Mr. Oyler, for 
the first time at the offices of the Respondent and advised 
Mr. Oyler that the "Appellant was now retired and wanted to invest 
a little money in something that was safe", and further advised 
Mr. Oyler that, "the Appellant had had no previous experience in 
buying stocks and bonds and would have to rely upon his (Oylerfs) 
experience and recommendations in order to guide the Appellant in 
making such investment". This was the first experience in the f^c 
stock market for the Appellant. (TR-92) 
The first investments made by the Appellant with the 
Respondent with the advice and counsel of its employee, Oyler, was 
in the purchase of two listed stocks of the Respondent in the sum 
of approximately $5,000.00. (TR-94) The investment taking place 
in June of 1973. (TR-94) 
In September of 1973, the Appellant visited the offices 
of the Respondent and was advised by Mr. Oyler, that Pacific 
Power and Light stock "wasn't doing very well, and not as much 
as he (Oyler) expected, and he would look around for something 
better for me to invest in, better than Pacific Power and Light." 
(TR-95) 
The Appellant was subsequently touted by Mr. Oyler into 
making a sale of his Power Company stock and to invest the proceeds 
or part of them into the purchase of Concepts International bonds. 
(TR-97) 
The Appellant did not know that Oyler was Secretary and 
Treasurer of Concepts International and that Oylerfs brother was 
President of said corporation (TR-97), but Appellant believed 
that he was at all times dealing with the Respondent Corporation 
and that all sales and representations were being made on behalf 
of the Respondent Corporation (TR-98). All of the dealings as 
between the Appellant and the Respondent's employee/ Mr. Oyler, 
took place at the place of business of the Respondent and no dealings 
or conversations were held by the Appellant except at the offices 
of the Respondent. (TR-95) The Appellant at all times relied upon 
the national reputation of the Respondent in having reliance upon 
its employee, Mr. Oyler. (TR-92) 
The Appellant, after being induced to purchase the bonds 
of Concepts International advised Mr. Oyler, that the payment for 
the bonds should be taken out of the sale of the Pacific Power and 
Light stock that was being carried on its records by the Respondent, 
but was advised by Mr. Oyler that, that would not be the best way 
to handle it, but that the best way to handle it would be to send 
the whole check to the bank from the sale of the listed stock and 
then write another check for the $2,000.00 directly to Concepts 
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International. (TR-98) The Appellant, being an inexperienced 
customer, assumed that that was the way the Respondent did its 
business, (TR-98) 
The manager of the Respondent brokerage corporation testi-
fied that his company did not sell any stocks or bonds of Concepts 
International (TR-126), and further, that they could not sell such 
bonds, in that there was no market for the resale of such bonds. 
(TR-127) It was further testified that the Respondent could not 
make a sale of Concepts International bonds because such bonds was 
not approved as an accredited stock of the Respondent Company. 
(TR-103) 
The Respondent testified that its employee, Robert Oyler, 
was constantly under the supervision of the Respondent's officers 
at its Ogden Office (R-16); that the advice and counsel given by 
employees was under the supervision of the officers of the 
Respondent Corporation; that it was customary for an Account 
Executive, such as the employee, to make recommendations and 
suggestions for the sale of stocks held by a customer account and 
recommendation for investment of such funds and other stocks, 
bonds, and debentures (R-18); that all Account Executives, such 
as the employee, Mr. Oyler, were required to periodically execute 
a disclaimer of outside interests and that the Respondent's manager 
periodically communicated with customers to see if the account was 
being properly handled. (R-18) 
Mr. Oyler testified that Respondent had knowledge, prior 
to the period that the investment was made by the Appellant, that 
Mr, Oyler had outside interests and a promotion, and that the 
management of the Respondent, with knowledge of the outside interest 
of Oyler, did not discharge the employee but warned him to dis-
continue (TR-137), and that the Respondent did not make any inquiries 
of the Appellant to determine how the Appellant's funds were being 
handled by its employee that the Respondent became aware of the 
purchase of Concepts International by the Appellant was after the 
release of Oyler. (TR-125) 
POINT I 
OYLER WAS RESPONDENT'S AGENT 
In considering the agency of an employee, where the 
employer is a stock broker, and the employee of the broker is a 
"customer's man" engaged primarily in soliciting commission business 
in securities for a stock broker, the Courts have generally made 
a distinction as to making a determination of whose agent the 
employee is acting for in the handling of the business of a customer, 
and as to the scope of liability of the employer has distinguished 
from the liability and scope of employment of an employee of one 
other than a stock broker's employee who commits an actionable tort. 
An example of the type of agency limitations of such other 
employees can be found in the Utah case of Keller vs. Gunn Supply, 
62 Ut. 491, 220 P. 1063, and Barney vs. Jewel Tea, 104 Ut. 292, 
139 P.2d 878, where this Court held, that in both of these actions, 
the committing of an act of violence by the employee was not within 
the scope of his employment. 
In the instant case we have an employee who is engaged by 
the employer in meeting the clientele of the broker and in furnishing 
advice and counsel as to the purchase and acquisition of stocks 
and bonds and advising as to the timeliness of the sale of same, 
and in the instant matter before the Court, the Appellant made an 
original purchase of stock from the Appellant and then was touted 
into selling one of the stocks purchased and purchasing another 
stock on the representation that it was a safer and better invest-
ment, with all of the representations and transactions taking place 
upon the premises of the Respondent. (TR-95) 
This very principle of agency was recognized in the case 
of Lewis vs. Walston and Company, 487 F.2d 617, U.S.C.A., Fifth 
Circuit, November 23, 1973, wherein the buyer of unregistered 
securities brought an action for their loss against the broker and 
the broker's registered representative. The Plaintiff was a customer 
of Walston and Company and was touted into purchasing unregistered 
stock in a company that went into receivership and purchased said 
stock on the basis of the representations of the brokerage companyfs 
employee as to the merits of the nonregistered stock. 
The Fifth Circuit Court upholding liability as to 
Walston and Company for the acts of its employee did so upon the 
grounds, that the employee was acting within the scope of her 
employment and cited the following as its authority therein: 
The American Law Institutes Restatement (2nd) of Agency 
describes what is meant by the term "within the scope 
of employment" in the following manner: 
(1) To be within the scope of employment, conduct must 
be of the same general nature as that authorized or 
incidental to the conduct authorized. 
(2) In determining whether or not conduct, although 
not authorized, is nevertheless so similar or incidental 
to the conduct authorized as to be within the scope of 
employment, the following matters of fact are to be 
considered: 
(a) Whether or not the act is one commonly done by 
such servants; 
(b) The time, place, and purpose of the act; 
(c) The previous relation between the master and 
servant; 
* * * 
(f) Whether or not the master had reason to expect 
that such an act will be done; 
(g) The similarity and quality of the act done to the 
act authorized; 
(h) Whether or not the instrumentality by 
which the harm is done had been furnished by 
the master to the servant; 
(i) The extent of departure from the normal method 
of accomplishing an authorized result; and 
(j) Whether or not the act is seriously criminal. 
It is submitted to the Court, that the action of Oyler in 
touting the unregistered stock to the Appellant and in arranging 
the method for the purchase and sale transaction of the stock are 
acts commonly done by brokers and was routinely of the same nature 
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as were commonly within the duties and performance of an Account 
Executive in dealing with clients, and specifically so in the instant 
matter before this Court; that the offices of the Respondent was the 
only place used in arranging all of the matters concerning the 
transaction, and that Oyler used his position as an Account Executive 
to recruit purchases and buyers for Concepts International stock 
from among customers of the Respondent. The testimony and record 
indicates that Mr. Oyler had sold $13,000.00 worth of bonds to 
other persons in addition to the $2,000.00 worth of bonds sold to 
the Appellant (TR-152), and in direct questioning concerning sales 
that were made while Oyler was employed at the Respondent's brokerage 
house, stated as follows: 
Q. Did you sell any bonds to people while you were ^fe 
employed at Merrill, Lynch other than Mr. Sheley? ^^ 
And we are talking again about Concepts International. 
A. Well, your Honor, at this point, I would like to stand 
on the Fifth Amendment, due to the fact that the 
attorney has mentioned that if this doesn't go through, 
he might sue me for fraud, and at this time I would 
like to stand on the Fifth Amendment, so I would rather 
not incriminate myself at the present time. (TR-153) 
The Circuit Court held in the Walston case, that an argument 
that the employee was acting beyond the scope of her employment, in 
that the employer did not deal in unregistered securities and that 
the employer never stood to receive and never did receive any com-
mission or other financial benefits from the sale of stock, was only 
a superficial supportive basis of argument, and that the conduct is 
within the scope of employment even if it is unauthorized if it is 
' sufficiently similar to authorized conduct, and that the receiving 
of any financial benefit from the transaction is not of a controlling 
importance, in that if a particular act is authorized, or sufficientl; 
similar to an authorized act, finding that act to be within the 
scope of employment does not require that the act has conferred 
any particular benefit, financial or otherwise, on the employer. 
Andrews vs. Seidner, 49 Cal.App.2d 427, 121 P.2d, p. 864, 
held: 
Responsibility of a principal results from acts so 
committed, even though they be contrary to the 
principal's explicit instructions, or otherwise 
unauthorized, or malicious or wilful. In considering 
whether an unauthorized wrongful act of an agent is 
attributable to his principal, we cannot look to the 
nature of such act alone to see whether it was com-
mitted in and as a part of the transaction of the 
principal's business, but we must consider as well 
* the activity of the agent on behalf of the principal 
in connection with which the act was committed. The 
inquiry is not whether the wrongful act itself was 
authorized, but whether it was committed in the course 
of a series of acts of the agent which were authorized 
by the principal. ***the fact that the questioned 
act was unauthorized or, if wrongful, that it was not 
committed in order to further the interest of the 
principal, will not show such a departure from the 
service of a principal as will absolve the latter if 
the act was committed while the agent was still occuping 
himself with the principal's business within the scope 
of his employment. 
Clothier vs. Beane, et al, 105 P.2d 752, Sup.Ct. of Okla., 
February, 1940, was a case wherein Fenner and Beane was engaged in 
a stock brokerage business and one, Clothier, was induced by an 
employee of Fenner and Beane to purchase shares of stock in a 
corporation after certain representations were made to Clothier as 
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to the value of the stock and dividends that would be paid by the 
ownership of said stock. 
The Court held that the employee of Fenner and Beane was 
engaged primarily in the solicitation of commission business in 
securities for his employer, and that it was within the apparent 
scope of his authority to make representations to prospective 
customers concerning the desirability of certain stocks as an 
investment, and that in so doing, the individual is acting as the 
agent and representative of the broker. The Court further held 
that in the absence of any facts showing authority to act for the 
customer, that the broker's employee will be considered as the 
agent of the broker and that if in such instant a loss is occasioned 
to the employee's misconduct, the broker and not the customer man ^ | 
must sustain the loss. 
The Court further held in this case, that as between the 
customer and the broker, the right of a customer to repudiate 
may be exercised whenever facts come to the customer's knowledge, 
regardless of how long that may be after the execution has been 
made. Such repudiation may be made even at the trial if knowledge 
of the facts is first acquired at this time and the right is 
unaffected by whether the customer has sustained a loss or not. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT HAS LIABILITY FOR DECEIT OF ITS AGENT 
The Appellant clearly set forth in his Complaint all of 
-11-
the elements for an action in deceit as established by this Court 
in Pace vs. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273, 1952, wherein the Appellant 
alleged in support of such action in deceit the following: 
1. That a representation was made, that Robert Oyler was 
its agent and "Customer Account Executive"; (R-l) was particularly 
trained in advising customer clientele as to the timely sale and 
purchase of stocks and bonds; that the Appellant was dealing through 
its agent, Oyler, and that Oyler had authority to purchase and 
sell stocks and bonds on behalf of the Appellant as an employee and 
agent of the Respondent; that the Respondent's agent advised the 
Appellant to purchase Pacific Power and Light stock and subse-
quently to sell same (TR-97); that an investment of $2,000.00 in 
Concepts International by the purchasing of bonds in said Company 
was an investment in the best interest of the Appellant. (R-2)(TR-97) 
2. That the representations were those as to a presently 
existing material fact; _ 
3. That the representation made by Respondent's agent was . 
false, in that the sale of Concepts International was a stock not 
being made through the Respondent nor one in which the Respondent 
could deal in; that the representation as to the value of the bonds 
of Concepts International was untrue and that the payment of money 
by the Appellant by check made directly to the agent's own corpora-
tion was represented as being the ordinary and proper way to handle 
a purchase of bonds which was untrue. 
4. That the agent, being the Secretary-Treasurer of 
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Concepts International (TR-129), wherein his brother was President 
and his mother was also an officer (TR-129) was made by the agent 
with knowledge that the representation was false and that all of the 
representations set forth hereinabove the agent knew to be false. 
5. That the representations were made for the purpose 
of inducing the Appellant to act upon the representations so made. 
6. That the Appellant reasonably believed that the 
representations were true and was ignorant of any of the falsity 
of the representations so made (TR-92) and as to the manner and 
methods of payment by ;a brokerage customer for stock was unknown to 
the Appellant, (TR-98) in that he was engaged in purchasing of stock 
through a brokerage house for the first time ever. 
7. That the Appellant did in fact rely upon the represen-^^ 
tations, in that he did pay the sum of $2,000.00 to the agent for 
the purchase of the bonds of Concepts International. (TR-98) 
8. That the Appellant was induced to act by belief of 
all of the representations made by the Respondent's agent. (TR-115) • 
9. That the Appellant suffered damages, in that there is 
no market for said bonds (TR-127,132) and that there has never been 
any trading as was testified at time of trial in the repurchase of 
any bonds from those who had purchased same, (TR-133) and further, 
that the assets of the Company as of the time of the sale of the 
bonds to the Appellant was of a zero balance. (TR-134) 
In the Chamberlain vs. Simpson, 343 P.2d 438, D.C. of 
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Appeal, California/ Aug., 1959, the Court defined "deceit" by 
stating: 
Deceit is either the suggestion as a fact, of that which 
is not true by one who does not believe it to be true, or 
the suppression of the fact by one who is bound to disclose 
it, or who gives information of other facts, which are 
likely to mislead for want of communication of that fact. 
The Respondent's agent failed to reveal to the Appellant 
that the agent was the Secretary-Treasurer of a corporation controllec 
entirely by himself, his brother, and mother; that there was no 
market for the bonds; that the bonds were not being sold on behalf 
or through the agent's principal, the Respondent herein. 
It is submitted to the Court, that the principle of law 
set forth in Samora vs. Bradford, 465 P.2d 88, Court of Appeals of 
f New Mexico, Jan., 1970, is fundamentally sound, wherein the Court 
has stated: 
Uncontradicted evidence, which is not subject to 
reasonable doubts, may not be arbitrarily disregarded. 
The evidence in the record shows without contradiction, 
that all of the representations hereinabove set forth as having 
been made to the Appellant and having been made by the agent, 
Oyler, on behalf of his principal, the Respondent herein, is 
uncontradicted, and further, is substantially admitted by the 
direct testimony of Oyler, and therefore, could not have been 
arbitrarily disregarded in the final decision rendered in the Lower 
Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court, that the Lower 
Court erred in its holding, that the Appellant had failed by 
clear and convincing evidence to establish that Oyler had made 
a false representation and in finding that Oyler was not the 
agent of the Respondent by reason of the sale of the touting 
of Oyler's company's bonds to the Appellant at a time when Oyler 
was acting as an Account Executive on behalf of the Respondent, 
and that the distinction drawn by the Restatement of Agency as 
set forth in the Walston case and the Walston case itself of the 
Fifth Circuit established adequate precedent for the establishment 
of such Agency Law in the State of Utah, which is not contrary to 
any other case law presently now as precedent in the State of Utah 
and that as a proximate result of the acts of the Respondent, the 
Appellant suffered damages in the amount of $2,000.00 plus loss 
of interest. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VLAHOS & KNOWLTON 
> 
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